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This study is the attempt to analyze the demand of rice farmers for the area 
yield crop insurance, which is designed and piloted in the period of 2011 - 2013 
in Vietnam according to Decision No. 315/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister. Using 
the contingent valuation method and experimental method, we estimate the 
willingness to pay of farmers in Binh Thuan province for area yield crop 
insurance and the factors influence the demand of farmers. We find that 
although farmers in Binh Thuan province are highly averse to basis risk, when 
farmers receive enough information about the insurance, the demand should be 
higher than current take up rate. However, the marketing channel of the 
insurance program is inefficient in providing information and building the mutual 
understanding between farmers and insurance company. Moreover, the 
demand for area yield crop insurance can also increase if the insurance company 
takes the advantages of the multi-regional setting of the program. In this case, 
insurance company should pay more attention to the relative level of basis risk 
and the correlation of losses across regions when setting the prices for each 




1 Introduction  
Agriculture is an important sector in Vietnam's economy, providing livelihoods 
for about 70% of the population and contributing more than 20% of GDP of the 
nation (Dao Trong Tu and Nguyen Van Viet, 2011). However, agricultural 
production is also exposed to a variety of risks, including adverse weather 
events, pests and diseases. Every year, the total agricultural production losses in 
Vietnam due to natural perils are nearly 5% of GDP (Menzinger, 2011). As 
Vietnam is one of the countries affected seriously by climate change, these risks 
are increasing day by day (Dasgupta et al., 2007). 
On 01 March, 2011, the Prime Minister approved Decision No. 315/QD-TTg 
about the implementation of pilot program on agricultural insurance in the 
period of 2011-2013. There are 3 different agricultural insurance products, in 
which crop insurance for rice production is an area-yield based insurance. Under 
an area yield crop insurance contract, indemnities are based on the value of an 
average yield of an area instead of the value of individual yield. In the piloting 
period, there are 7 provinces participating in the program of the rice crop 
insurance with different crop premium. The government will subsidize up to 
100% of insurance premium. 
Index insurance in general or area yield crop insurance in particular is a newly 
developed alternative to overcome the problems of traditional agricultural 
insurance. Before the introduction of the such new product, many developing 
countries (for example, Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico, India and the Philippines) 
have implemented agricultural insurance programs in which traditional 
agricultural insurance based on individual yield have been provided. However, 
most of these programs failed in fulfilling their objectives (Mahul and J. Stutley, 
2010). There are two main problems leading to the failure of this type of agri-
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cultural insurance. First, because farmers have more information about their 
own actual yields and thus can calculate their actuarial fairness more exactly 
than insurance companies, adverse selection will arise (Miranda, 1991). Second, 
difficulty in loss adjustment and record keeping, especially in the situation of 
developing countries, will lead to the problem of high administrative and 
monitoring cost and uncontrolled moral hazard. As a result, traditional 
agricultural insurance programs are often not sustainable and cost-effective 
(Mahul and J. Stutley, 2010). 
Under index insurance, indemnities are triggered by pre-specified value of an 
index, not by individual yields. Theoretically, index insurance helps to reduce the 
problem of adverse selection because information about the distribution of the 
index is more reliable and available than information regarding the distribution 
of individual yield. Moral hazard problem can also be eliminated as the index 
cannot be affected by farmers or any 3rd party. Moreover, because indemnity 
payout is not based on individual yield and the index value is observable, loss 
assessment at individual level is not needed and the administrative and 
monitoring costs are reduced (Miranda, 1991; Skees et al., 1997; Iturrioz, 2009). 
However, the existing evidence from other countries show that the take-up 
rate of index insurance is low even when the premium rate is actuarially fair and 
the product is subsidized (Boucher and Mullaly, 2010). Many studies have 
examined the demand for such products and suggested that low demand is 
caused by lack of trust, financial illiteracy, credit constraints and most 
importantly, basis risk (Gin et al., 2008; Gin and Yang, 2009; Carter, 2009; Cole et 
al., 2009; Boucher and Mullaly, 2010). Basis risk refers "the potential mismatch 
between contract payouts and the actual loss experienced by individual farmers" 
(UN, 2007, p.6). When participating in the index insurance, a farmer may suffer a 
yield loss but doesn't receive an indemnity if the index value is not lower than 
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the critical threshold. Basis risk may decrease the effectiveness of this type of 
insurance in risk reducing and therefore decrease the demand of farmers. 
Moreover, in the situation of developing countries where farmers are not 
familiar with modern financial products, it's very hard to explain the index 
insurance to farmers and make them accept the possibility of suffering a loss but 
not receiving the indemnity. Carter (2009) proposed that a careful analysis from 
demand-side to choose acceptable index signal, to identify trust-inducing 
indemnity structures and to design effective training for farmers is needed for 
establishing sustainable and efficient index insurance program. 
Vietnamese rice crop insurance program has been implemented since 
September 2011 but after 10 months of piloting, this program is facing the same 
problem of low demand as other developing countries' index insurance program. 
Only two provinces (Nghe An and Dong Thap) now have households purchasing 
rice crop insurance while in other provinces, farmers are not interested in this 
insurance product. As the area yield crop insurance product is being revised to 
be scheduled for large-scale sale in the whole country after the pilot program, it 
is needed to understand why the demand is low and how to establish an 
effective and sustainable demand for this area yield crop insurance program. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effectiveness of the area yield 
crop insurance program in risk management and the effective demand of rice 
farmers in Vietnam. We first carry out a contingent valuation (CV) survey to 
examine the demand of farmers for this area yield crop insurance program in 
Binh Thuan province of Vietnam. CV method is used in several studies of index 
insurance in developing countries (Ramasubramanian, 2012; Seth, Ansari and 
Datta, 2012; Chantarat, Mude and Barrett, 2009) but for Vietnam, to our best 
knowledge, there are only two studies using this method to estimate the 
demand for area yield crop insurance (Vandeveer, 2001; Nguyen, 2013) in which 
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only one study by Nguyen (2013) tried to determine the willingness to pay of rice 
farmers in Dong Thap province for this insurance product. Our study follows the 
design of these studies in examining the willingness to pay for this insurance of 
farmers under current design and determining factors influencing the demand of 
farmers. 
We then focus on the impact of basis risk on the demand for the area yield 
crop insurance. Due to the lack of historical data, we cannot measure the true 
basis risk for each farmer and incorporate this value into the CV study. We 
therefore use the framed eld experiment in Binh Thuan province to examine 
whether farmers are not willing to join in the area yield crop insurance due to 
the basis risk. 
Finally, we adopt an expected-value-variance approach by Ducan and Myers 
(2000) and Shen and Odening (2012) to simulate the equilibrium prices and the 
participant ratios of area yield crop insurance in a multi-region setting. 
Theoretically, insurance company can overcome the problem of basis risk by 
regional diversification. If losses among regions are negatively correlated, 
enlarging the trading area of the insurance can help insurance company to 
reduce the premium rate and therefore attract more customers (Shen and 
Odening, 2012). Premium rates in this case not only depend on the general level 
of risk exposure of each region but the relative basis risk level across regions. 
Results from the simulation will shed some light on pricing the insurance under 
multi-region setting. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
background context of agricultural production, agricultural insurance and area 
yield crop insurance program in Vietnam and Binh Thuan province where we 
conduct our study. Section 3 presents our CV study in Section 4 with a review of 
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relevant literature on the demand for index-based insurance and the results 
from our survey. We then move to our experiment and the result in Section 4. In 
section 5, we presents the equilibrium framework for both single region and 
multi-region settings and the results of the simulation from this framework for 
the area yield insurance for rice producers in Binh Thuan and An Giang 
provinces. Section 6 is the discussion and conclusion. 
2 An Overview about Area Yield Crop Insurance in Viet-nam  
2.1 Area Yield Crop Insurance for Rice Producers in Vietnam  
Although the Decision No.315/QD-TTG about the implementation of pilot 
program on agricultural insurance was approved on 01 March 2011, it was not 
until the Winter-Spring crop 2012 that the insurance marketing program was 
launched. Main features of the area yield crop insurance at the beginning of 3-
year pilot program are summarized as follows: 
1. Provinces and Areas covered: there are 7 provinces joining in this pilot 
program for rice crop insurance including Nam Dinh, Thai Binh, Nghe An, Ha 
Tinh, Binh Thuan, Dong Thap and An Giang. In the Winter - Spring crop 
2012 and the Summer - Autumn crop 2012, only 3 communes of 3 districts 
of each province were chosen to introduce this insurance. Since the 
Autumn - Winter 2012, the market has been expanded to most of the 
communes of 3 districts of each province.  
2. Farmers covered: All  farmers are covered 
3. Risks covered: this insurance covers all yield losses due to common natural 
calamities and epidemic - insect risk.  
4. Coverage and threshold yield: the scope of area in this insurance is the 
commune level. If the actual average yield per hectare of the rice crop for 
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the commune in the insured season is lower than the Threshold yield, all 
insured farmers in this area will receive an indemnity. In the first design of 
this insurance, the threshold yield was defined as 75% of the three-year 
moving average of seasonal area yields. After the revision of this program 
in late 2012, this threshold yield changed to 90% of the three-year moving 
average of seasonal area yield.  
5. Premium rate: Different provinces have different premium rates, which are 
summarized in Table 1. These premium rates are based on the risk 
exposure level of the province.  
6. Premium subsidy: The subsidy rate for poor farmers is 100% of the 
premium, for nearly-poor farmers is 80%, for normal farmers is 60% of the 
premium rate.  
Table 1: Premium rates of different province 
 
After one year of piloting, the total insured area is 36,997 ha, with 160,787 
households participating in this insurance, of which about 85% are poor 
households. This result is very low compared with the total piloted. It raises 
question about the feasibility of this program as well as the reasons why 
farmers are not interested in area yield crop insurance. 
2.2 Area Yield Crop Insurance for Rice Producers in Binh Thuan Province  
Binh Thuan province is one of the provinces implementing the pilot program of 
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area yield crop insurance in Vietnam. There are 3 districts of Binh Thuan 
participating in this pilot program, including Bac Binh, Ham Thuan Bac and 
Tanh Linh. After one year, the total number of households buying area yield 
crop insurance is 3,502 households, 100% of which are poor households. There 
was no payment during the first year of the pilot program. According to the 
preliminary report provided by the People's Committee of Binh Thuan 
province, there are two main reasons for the low demand of area yield crop 
insurance, that are: (1.) the high premium rate and (2.) the unreasonable 
payout policy of this insurance due to the basis risk. 
3 Willingness to pay for the area yield crop insurance of rice production 
farmers in Binh Thuan province - A contingent valuation survey  
3.1 Research methodologies and survey design  
3.1.1 Contingent valuation method  
To explore the factors influencing the demand of farmers for index insurance, 
we use the contingent valuation method (CVM). CVM is widely used in empirical 
literature on agricultural insurance demand where the agricultural market has 
not been developed or underdeveloped (Kouame and Komenan, 2012). 
Willingness to pay for index insurance can be expressed as follows: 
 
where q1 and q0 are the levels of utility associated with and without insurance, y 
is wealth, X represents a vector of socio economic characteristics, π is probability 
of facing the risk, and ε is other unobserved factors. Φ(.) is the maximum value 
individuals are willing to pay to reduce their level of risk. 




where V(.) are indirect utility function for an individual and ε1 and ε0 are 
assumed to be independent and identically distributed with zero mean. 
Due to the fact that surveyed farmers are mainly not familiar with the index 
insurance, we thus use the close-ended question in our case. We conducted the 
double-bounded dichotomous choice procedure because this approach has 
more significant statistical efficiency gains than other methods (Hanemann, 
1991). 
3.1.2 Determinants of demand for index insurance  
In recent years, there is a growing number of empirical studies trying to identify 
factors that influence demand for index insurance and analyze how to make this 
product more attractive for farmers, many of which employed experimental 




1. Economic aspects of the product: the role of basis risk, premium and the payout 
frequency.  
Basis risk is the most important feature of index insurance, making this product 
different from the traditional agricultural insurance. Therefore, many studies 
tried to examine the role of basis risk in demand for index insurance. However, 
due to the lack of historical data in developing countries, till now, there is no 
study that can measure basis risk at individual levels and correlate real basis risk 
on the demand of farmers. Researchers instead use many different ways to deal 
with this problem, including measuring the basis risk through introspection 
(directly ask farmers about the correlation between their own yield and the 
average yield) or setting the objective basis risk through framed field 
experiment (Clarke, 2011; Norton et al., 2012, Cole et al., 2008, Hill et al, 2011). 
They all found that basis risk significantly reduced the demand for index 
insurance, especially at high price.  
2. Risk aversion and time preference.  
Risk preference can be seen as one of the main determinants of demand for 
index insurance and was included in all studies about index insurance. However, 
the impact of this factor on the demand of index insurance is not clear. While 
some studies found that high risk-averse farmers will have high demand for 
insurance (Kouame and Komenan, 2012; Chantarat, Mude and Barrett, 2009), 
other studies found the oppoisite direction (Gine, Townsend and Vickery, 2008) 
or no effects (Clarke et al., 2012).  
Because in many index insurance products, farmers have to pay the premium at 
the beginning of the crop season and only receive the possible payment at a 
particular time after the end of the crop season, one should expected farmers 
with high discount rates tend to not join the insurance. However, most of the 
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studies cannot find the effect of time preference on the demand for index 
insurance (Chantarat et al., 2009).  
3. The crowding out effect of current risk management strategies.  
As one of the risk management strategies, the demand for index insurance is 
influenced by the availability and effectiveness of other strategies such as 
diversification, access to saving and borrowings, or risk poolings through social 
networks. Binswagner-Mkhize (2012) argued that analysis of the demand for 
index insurance without taking into account the interaction between formal 
insurance and other risk strategies can lead to overestimating the demand.  
4. Non-economic factors: trust and financial literacy. 
While the key elements of the design of index insurance (basis risk, premium 
and payout frequency) are crucial for attracting farmers, empirical evidence 
suggested that non-economic factors such as trust, financial literacy and social 
networks are also very important (Gin et al., 2008, Gin et al., 2009, Gin et al., 
2012, McPeak et al., 2010)  
In our contingent valuation study, we include all of these factors, except the 
basis risk, in our question and will examine the impact of these factors on the 
demand for  the index insurance. 
3.1.3 The survey  
- The study area: 
This study was conducted in 5 communes (Lac Tanh, Huy Khiem, Bac Ruong, 
Nghi Duc, Duc Binh) of Tanh Linh district, Binh Thuan province. We chose 
these communes because according to the group discussion with agricultural 
experts of the district government, these communes can capture all variations 
in the natural condition of Tanh Linh. We adopted a multi-stage sampling 
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strategy and 276 farmers in 5 communes were randomly interviewed in 
August 2013. All of them are rice production farmers.  
- Focus-group discussion: 
6 focus-group discussion was conducted with insurance company (Bao Minh), 
local authority of Tanh Linh district and farmers in Tanh Linh district in 
January, March and July, 2013 to identify the starting price for the WTP 
question as well as explore the risk management strategies currently used 
here.  
- The questionnaire:  
The final questionnaire includes 5 sections. Section 1 comprises questions 
about the social and economic characteristics of the respondents. Section 2 
comprises questions about risk experience, risk perception, social capital, 
time preference as well as risk management strategies of farmers. Questions 
about farmers' information and purchase decisions towards the current pilot 
insurance program are asked in Section 3 and Section 4 is the CV question 
about the willingness to pay.  
Section 5 is the Binswanger experiment to measure risk attitude of farmers 
(Binswanger, 1980, 1981). In this experiment, farmers have to choose 
among 6 different lotteries (Table 2), corresponding to different levels of 
risk attitude (different constant relative risk aversion - CRRA). In the total 
sample, 83 participants were randomly chosen to play the Binswanger 
experiment for real payment while the others would  play the hypothetical 
Binswanger experiment and 60 other participants in Lac Tanh commune 
were invited to join a framed field experiment later. Each farmer 





Table 2: Binswanger Experiment 
 
The valuation section (Section 3) comprises an explanation about the area 
yield crop insurance, a test of the understanding of farmers about this 
insurance and a double-bounded choice. Under this method, each 
respondent is asked if she/he is willing to pay the first bid. If she/he choose 
"yes", a second higher bid will be given. If she or he choose "no", a second 
lower bid will be given. Respondent continues to make decision on whether 
she/he is willing to pay the second bid. Five different first bids were 
randomly used in the survey to avoid the starting bias (Table 3). These 
amounts are based on the average of current premium rate at Tanh Linh 
district (about 408,830 VND/ha). 
3.2 Results  
3.2.1 Household characteristics  
The age of farmers participating in the survey ranges from 23 to 83 while the 
number of years they have been involved in rice production is from 3 to 69. 
Most of respondents are male. 30% of them belong to ethnic minority group. 
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Table 3: Design of the valuation question 
 
All farmers in  Tanh Linh district grow rice in 3 crop seasons. On average, 
monthly income of a household is per capita of farmers is 4,460,000 
VND/month. Farmers derive income from rice production as well as other crops 
such as pepper and cashew. They also keep livestock or have off-farm activities. 
While the percentage of farmers who save money for future risk is low (0.40%), 
the percentage of income derived from other activities and the percentage of 
farmers who have borrowed in the last 5 years are high (30% and 78% 
respectively). This was consistent with the findings of  group discussion, in which 
farmers suggested that the main risk management strategies are diversification 
and risk pooling through social network. 
3.2.2 Risk aversion and time preference of farmers  
Table 4 shows the results from Binswanger experiment for both real and 
hypothetical questions. There is no significant difference between the risk 
aversion proportion of the real and the hypothetical group (Wilcoxon test: p = 
0.174). 




To measure time preference, we use two hypothetical questions about the 
amount farmers are willing to accept now to give up the payment of 800,000 
VND after 6 months and the amount they are willing to accept 6 months from 
now to give up the payment of 800,000 VND after one year. The first question is 
used to calculate the discount rate of farmers while the second question is used 
to examine whether farmers are present-biased or future-biased. Table 5 
presents the results from these two questions. We do not  find the evidence for 
future-biased but 44% of farmers have a tendency of present bias. 
Table 5: Time preferences of farmers 
 
3.2.3 Farmers' under studying and opinions about the current pilot insurance 
program  
Although Tanh Linh is one of the pilot districts for the area yield crop insurance 
program, after 3 years of implementation, only 37% of farmers in our survey 
stated that they have heard about this insurance. Table 6 presents the 
information channel from which farmers heard about area yield crop insurance. 
Table 6: Information channel of insurance 
 
Farmers received information about the area yield crop insurance mainly 
from the media and local authority. Only few farmers were approached by the 
insurance company and the proportion of farmers received information from 
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their social networks is also very low. There may be a number of explanations 
for this: farmers did not find this product attractive so that they did not  
introduce or talk with the others in their network about it or may be because 
the information was not provided to the key people in the village/commune. 
We also asked farmers who stated that they have heard about the area yield 
crop insurance to describe the insurance for us. Only 1 farmer could  describe 
exactly this insurance while the others do not  know the fee and do not  
understand the payment conditions. “Do not understand the product” is also 
the main reason for farmers to not buy the insurance (44%). The marketing 
strategy for the area yield crop is obviously ineffective. 
3.2.4 WTP and factors influencing the demand of farmers for area yield crop 
insurance  
We run the maximum likelihood model for the WTP. The average WTP of the 
farmers calculated from the estimation is approximately  398,530 VND per 
hectare, which is very close to the premium in case of 60% subsidy. This result 
suggests that when farmers receive sufficient  information about the insurance, 
the demand should be higher than current take up rate and the main problem of 
the current pilot program is the marketing channel. 
Table 7 presents the marginal effects of all factors on the WTP. Among 3 risk 
management strategies we examine here, only diversification had significant 
effect on the WTP. Diversification had a negative impact on the WTP: farmers 
who have higher proportion of income derived from rice production (lower level 
of diversification) will have higher WTP. We found no significant effect of risk 
attitude on the WTP of farmers. This result may be explained through the 
suggestions of Elabed and Carter (2013) and Bryan (2010): not risk attitude but 
ambiguity attitude influences  the demand of farmers for area yield crop 
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insurance. For time preference, while the discount rate of farmers did not  have 
any significant effect on WTP, we found an interesting result about the effect of 
time inconsistency, that is farmer who are present biased will have lower WTP. 
Among 4 socio-economic variables, only education has effect on the WTP of 
farmers. Trust and financial literacy have significant impact on the WTP of 































4 Basis risk and area yield crop insurance: Evidence from a framed field 
experiment  
Basis risk is one of the most important problems of the index insurance. Basis 
risk causes two effects on the demand of farmers: (1) through the imperfect 
correlation between farmers' loss and payoff; (2) through the level of ambiguity 
of this product, which may reduce the demand if farmers are ambiguity averse 
(Elabed and Carter, 2013). Due to the lack of historical data, in the contingent 
valuation study, we do not  have any variable capturing the basis risk. Instead, 
we examine the effects of basis risk on the demand of farmers for area yield 
crop insurance through a framed field experiment, by which we can control the 
basis risk. This experiment is designed in the same way as the experiment of 
Elabed and Carter (2013) in Mali with some modifications. In this experiment, 
farmers face with a hypothetical situation in which they invest in crop 
production and have to decide between three different options to manage their 
production risk: (1) doing nothing; (2) buying an area yield crop insurance; (3.) 
buying a(n) (traditional) indemnity crop insurance. 
4.1 Experimental Design  
4.1.1 The production game  
The production game includes several rounds, in which each round represents 
one crop season. At the beginning of each round, each farmer is assigned to a 
group representing the area. During each round, farmers may gain different 
amount of points, depending on their individual yield which is determined by the 
combination of two shocks: the systematic shock and the idiosyncratic shock. 
The systematic shock will affect the endowment of every farmers in the group 
while the idiosyncratic shock only affect the endowment of individual farmer. 
These two shocks are described to farmers by two gambles. The systematic 
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shock is described as "Area Condition" and this shock is drawn from a bag 
containing 10 chips (1 black, 2 red, 4 white, 2 blue and 1 green). At the end of 
each round, one farmer from each group will draw a chip from this bag to 
determine the "Area Condition". If she/he draw the black chip, it means that the 
"area condition" is very bad; if she/he draw the red chips, it means that the 
"area condition" is bad, etc. The idiosyncratic risk is described as "Individual 
Luck" and this shock is drawn by each farmer from a bag containing 4 balls (1 
red, 2 white, 1 yellow). If she/he draw the red ball, it means that the "individual 
luck" is low; if she/he draw the white ball, it means that the "individual luck" is 
normal, etc. The individual yield of each farmer will be calculated based on the 
area condition and the individual luck (Table 8). For example, if one farmer in 
one round draw the white ball for the individual luck (Normal) and his/her group 
draw the red ball for the area condition (Bad), he/she will have the yield of 350 
for this round. 
Table 8 also presents the probability distributions of the systematic risk and 
the idiosyncratic risk. We derive these two probability distributions from group 
discussions with farmers and local authority of Lac Tanh commune, Tanh Linh 
district, Binh Thuan province to make sure that these probability distributions 
can represent the subjective probability of farmer towards systematic risk and 








Table 8: Payoffs of farmers in the production game 
 
4.1.2 The insurance treatment  
In the insurance treatment of the production game, farmers have a chance to 
buy insurance to protect their income against production loss. We design two 
different insurance products, including the area yield crop insurance and the 
traditional indemnity insurance. 
The area yield crop insurance offered in this experiment is designed with the 
following parameters: 
- The threshold level: In this experiment, we chose the coverage level of 
90% and the expected area yield crop is the yield of the whole area in a 
normal condition (i.e. long-term average area yield - 450 qt per hectare). 
This area yield crop is calculated based on 10-year yield data of Winter 
Spring crop in Lac Tanh commune, Tanh Linh district, Binh Thuan province.  
- The premium: We calculate the actuarially fair price based on the 
probabilities and outcomes of two events: very bad area condition and bad 
area condition. The actuarially fair price of area yield crop insurance = price 
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of one unit of rice x (10% x (90% x 450 - 200) + 20% x (90% x 450 - 350)). We 
assume that the price of one unit of rice is constant and equal to one unit, 
then the actuarially fair price of area yield crop insurance is 31.5. We add 
the loading factor of 20% to this price and come up with the price of 37.8 
for area yield crop insurance over one hectare of land. This loading factor is 
based on the review of World Bank of agricultural insurance (Mahul, O. and 
Stutley, C., 2010) as well as the mid-term reports of pilot provinces in 
Vietnam about area yield crop insurance. Elabed and Carter (2013) also 
used the loading factor of 20% in their experiment in Mali.  
The traditional indemnity insurance offered in this experiment is designed with 
the following parameters: 
- The threshold level: we still keep the same threshold level (405 pt per 
hectare ) as in the area yield crop insurance to make them comparable.  
- The premium: We calculate the actuarially fair price based on the 
probabilities and outcomes of the combined events between systematic 
risk and idiosyncratic risk which yield lower than the threshold. The 
actuarially fair price in this case = 10% x (25% x (405 - 80) + 50% x (405 - 
200) + 25% x (405 - 320)) + 20% x (25% x (405 - 250) + 50% x (405 - 350)) + 
40% x 25% x (405 - 350) = 39. We add the loading factor of 80% to this price 
and come up with the price of 71. The loading factor for indemnity 
insurance is considerably higher than for area yield crop insurance because 
in the case of indemnity insurance, the insurance company has to spend 
more money on investigating the loss. 
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4.1.3 Experimental procedure and data 
The participants are 59 farmers from Lac Tanh commune, Tanh Linh district, Binh 
Thuan province (at the beginning of the experiment we had 60 participants but 
during the session, one participant had to leave due to an emergency so that we 
only had 59 participants with full attendance). We chose participants randomly 
based on the household list given by local authority. After selecting participants, 
we did the WTP survey first to gather detailed information on socio-economic 
characteristics of participating farmers to make sure that our sample captures  
the diversity in socio-characteristics of farmers as well as to collect data on the 
WTP of farmers. Each participant then received an invitation letter to join in our 
experiment conducted in August 2013. At the end of the session, participants 
received their game winnings in cash, in addition to a show up fee of 30.000 
VND. 
The experimental procedures can be summarized as follows. After the 
introduction of the experiment session, we described the production game to 
farmers and they played 2 trial rounds to understand the payoff mechanism. The 
sequence of events in each round is: 
- One player drew a chip from the "Area Condition" bag to determine the 
systematic shock.  
- Each player drew a ball from the "Individual Luck" bag to determine the 
idiosyncratic shock.  
- Based on the payoff table, farmers calculated their yield and wrote it 
down on the record sheet. Our assistants helped farmers to identify their 
profits.  
After 2 trial round, farmers played 5 rounds of the first insurance treatment 
in which only area yield crop insurance was offered. The sequence of events in 
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each round now was: 
- Our assistants explained the area yield crop insurance  
- Farmers chose among 2 different options: doing nothing or buying the 
AYC insurance  
- One player drew a chip from the "Area Condition" bag to determine the 
systematic shock.  
- Each player drew a ball from the "Individual Luck" bag to determine the 
idiosyncratic shock.  
- Our assistants announced the indemnity of each insurance contract of this 
season.  
- Based on the payoff table, the premium level and the indemnity, farmers 
calculated their yield and wrote it down on the record sheet.  
Finally, farmers played 5 rounds of the second insurance treatment in which 
both area yield crop insurance and traditional insurance were offered. The 
sequence of events is exactly the same with 5 previous rounds except that now 
farmers have 3 options: doing nothing or buying the AYC insurance or buying the 
traditional insurance. 
At the end of the experiment, one of 12 rounds was chosen randomly to 
make the payment with an exchange rate (1 point = 150 VND) and farmers were 
paid this amount together with the attendance fee. 
4.2 Results  
Table 9 show the number of participants buying AYI in each round from round 3 
to round 5. In these rounds, participants are only allowed to choose between 
buying an AYI or not. The number of participants buying AYI was stable over 5 
rounds, suggesting that farmers were consistent in their decisions. 
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With the basis risk in our experiment (10%), under the assumption of 
maximizing the expected utility function, participants with CRRA lower than 
0.4675 will not buy the insurance and participants with CRRA higher than 0.4675 
will buy the area yield insurance. Based on the results from the Binswanger 
experiment, we can predict the percentage of participants who will buy the AYI 
in each round is from 68% to 83.25% (the percentage of participants who choose 
Lottery 1, 2 and part of participants choosing Lottery 3). 
Table 9: Number of participants buying AYI in each round of treatment 1 
 
Comparing between the CRRA in the Binswanger and the percentage of 
participants buying AYI in each round, we found that the percentages of 
participants buying AYI in all 5 rounds are lower than the prediction by expected 
utility theory. However, we also found that the more risk averse one participant 
is, the higher number of rounds in which he/she bought the AYI (Kruskal-Wallis 
test: p = 0.04). 
We are interested in the change in farmers' behaviors when there is a change 
in the basis risk. In our experiment, the change in the basis risk is represented by 
the introduction of the indemnity insurance since round 8. Table 10 shows the 
decisions of farmers from round 8 to round 12, when the indemnity insurance 





Table 10: The number of participants buying AYI in treatment 2 (round 8 – 12)  
 
When an individual yield insurance contract was introduced, we found a high 
proportion of participants switching from an AYI contract to an IYI contract or 
from not buying any insurance to an IYI contract. There was no new participants 
buying the AYI contract after the IYI contract was introduced. Under the 
assumption of expected utility theory, farmers only choose this IYI contract if 
their CRRA is higher than 4.53. However, based on the results of the Binswanger 
experiment, only 34% of participants choosing Lottery 1, which means they have 
CRRA higher than 7.5 and 13.6% participants choosing Lottery 2, which means 
their CRRA is from 1.74 to 7.51. Comparing between the CRRA distribution from 
the Binswanger and the distribution from the insurance choices from round 8 to 
round 12, we found that the percentage of choosing IYI is higher than the 
prediction. 
These above results suggest that the higher risk aversion, the higher demand 
of participants for the area yield crop insurance. However, risk aversion is not 
sufficient to explain the demand for area yield crop insurance. When 
participants only chose between AYI and no insurance, the demand for AYI is 
lower than prediction under expected utility theory. When the IYI was 
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introduced, participants tended to favor the insurance without basis risk even 
though they had to pay more than expected gains for this insurance. The 
percentage of participants switching from AYI to IYI is higher than prediction 
under expected utility theory, suggesting that participants are averse towards 
the basis-risk. 
The number of participants buying the IYI contract was not stable but 
increasing over the last 5 rounds. This result may come from the learning 
process or herding behavior of participants through communication during the 
experiment. However, with our data from this experiment, we cannot detect 
these effects, and thus we do not  have a reasonable explanation for this 
increasing tendency. 
We now examine the impact of experiencing the basis risk on the decision of 
switching at round 8. We only examine the switching behavior at round 8 to 
avoid the effect of communication and herding. Farmers' basis risk experience is 
measured through a dummy variable which equals to 1 if in the last 5 rounds 
(round 3 - 7) farmers bought the AYI contract but did not receive the payment 
when suffering a loss and equals to 0 otherwise. Result from a chi-square test 
suggested that there is a significant relationship between experiencing the basis 
risk and switching behaviors (p = 0.027). 
5 Price and demand for area yield crop insurance in a multi-regional setting  
Results from the framed field experiment suggest that due to ambiguity 
aversion, farmers will be less interested in area yield crop insurance. This 
problem can be partly solved through regional diversification. By enlarging the 
trading area of the insurance, if losses among regions are negatively correlated, 
insurance company can set the premium rate lower than in the case of single-
region (lower than the total of loading factor and fair rate) (Shen and Odening, 
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2012) and thus attract more customers. It's the advantage of the multi-regional 
setting when the insurance company can set different premium rates for 
different regions. 
Till now, we only examine the demand of farmers in Binh Thuan province 
with pre-determined price. In this section, we will analyze both demand and 
supply side of the insurance at the same time to see whether the current pricing 
policy of area yield crop insurance program in Vietnam takes the advantages of 
the multi-region setting and whether the multi-region setting can help to 
increase the demand of farmers. 
To answer this questions, we use the theoretical model developed by Shen 
and Odening (2012) to simulate the equilibrium prices and the participation 
ratios of area yield crop insurance for Binh Thuan province under two different 
scenarios: single-region setting and multi-region setting. Because we do not  
have a long time series on agricultural yield at farm level and at community 
level, we consider a whole region as a representative farm (all farmers in one 
region are assumed to have the same yield distribution) and area yields are 
represented by the provincial yields. Although there is drawback in using 
aggregate yield data, in this study we only use results derived from this model to 
compare between the single regional setting and the multi regional setting, not 
to give direct evaluation about the demand of insurance. 
5.1 Theoretical Model  
5.1.1 A Single Region Equilibrium Pricing  
Using the mean-variance framework, Shen and Odening (2012) developed a 
model comprises a single region with N farmers on the demand side and one 
insurance company on the supply side. They assumed that all agents are risk-
averse and their preferences take the exponential utility forms. At t = 0, farmers 
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and insurance company make decisions about buying or selling some amount of 
area yield crop insurance to maximize their expected utility. At t = 1, farmers and 
insurance company received information about the crop yields and the average 
yield of the whole area and the company payout the indemnity if the average 
yield is lower than the threshold. There is no secondary market for selling or 
buying insurance between two periods. 
By maximizing the expected utility of farmer, we have the optimal demand of 
farmer i for area yield crop insurance is: 
 
in which E(θ(I)) is expecting indemnity, π(1 + r) is the insurance premium, λf is 
the risk preference of farmer, σ2θ(I) is the volatility of the insurance payoff and 
cov(LiYi; θ(I)) is the covariance term between the production revenues and the 




The supply function of insurance company derived from the maximizing 
problem is: 
 
in which β is the number of insurance contracts the insurance company is willing 
to sell and  λS is the risk preference of insurance company. 
Market is at equilibrium if: 
 
5.1.2 A Multi-Region Equilibrium Pricing  
Under the multi-regional setting, there is only one insurance company facing M 
heterogeneous region and insurance company can set different prices for 
different regions. We define π1; π2; …; πM as equilibrium prices of region 1, 2, ... 
M and β1; β2; …; βM as corresponding equilibrium quantities. 
The optimal demand of farmer i in region m is the same with the optimal 
demand of farmer in the single regional setting but the supply function of 
insurance company at region m now also depend on the covariance of payoffs 
between region m and other regions: 
 




We use equations (1) and (2) to run the simulation of price and demand for 
Binh Thuan province under the case of single region setting and under the case 
of multi-region setting (when the insurance is also traded in An Giang Province). 
5.2 Results  
5.2.1 Specification of the parameters for analysis  
The area yield crop insurance is represented by the following payoff function: 
 
in which I is the actual area yield per hectare, T is the tick value (the price used 
to calculate the indemnity) and K is the threshold level. In our simulation, the 
tick value is assumed to be constant and equal to the average minimum 
purchase price policy for rice (type I and type II) in 2011 which is 500 thousand 
VND/quintal. Following the design of the pilot program, the threshold value K 
equals to 90% of the 3-year moving average of area yield of the same crop 
season. 
To run the equilibrium models we also need the parameters of risk aversion 
and risk-free interest rate. Result from the Binswanger experiment suggested 
that farmers in Binh Thuan are risk-averse with the median CRRA lies between 
1.74-0.81. Referring to some studies measuring the risk attitudes of Vietnamese 
farmers (Tanaka et al., 2010; Gloede, 2011; Nielsen et al., 2012) and some 
studies measuring this parameter of other developing countries (Gong et al., 
2010; Liebenehmand et al., 2011), we assume that the relative risk aversion 
parameter of farmers in are 0.8. The absolute risk aversion is then computed by 
by dividing the relative risk aversion parameter by the initial wealth of farmers. 
We assume that the initial wealth of farmers is equal to the annual cash income 
per household (50,332,800 VND), calculated by multiplying monthly average 
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income per capita (1,070,000 VND) by 12 and then household size (3.92) in rural 
areas (data based on the VHLSS 2010). The absolute risk aversion parameter of 
farmer therefore is assumed to equal 1.56x10-8. The absolute risk aversion of 
insurance company is assumed to be less than the risk aversion of farmers. The 
risk-free interest rate is 10% per annum, based on the average interest rate of 
the Government bond in the period of 2008 – 2011 (maturity of 5 years). Table 
11 summarizes all of the parameters used in the simulation. 
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5.2.2 Results of the simulation  
Table 12 presents the equilibirum prices and quantities for area yield insurnace 
in Binh Thuan province and An Giang province under two different settings: 
single-regional setting and multi-regional setting with two different scenarios of 
subsidy: no subsidy and subsidy of 60% of the premium. 
The results show that the insurance premia for Binh Thuan provinces do not 
change much when the insurer also provides insurance in An Giang province 
because the low correlations of area yield between An Giang and Binh Thuan. 
We only found a significant decrease in insurance premium (and thus a 
significant increase in the demand) for AW crop season. It is reasonable because 
AW crop season is the most risky crop season for An Giang province due to the 
flood while the yield risk for this season in Binh Thuan is moderate. Enlarging the 
trading area of the insurance in this case helps diversify the systemic yield risk 
due to the negative correlation between area yields among these two provinces 
and therefore helps increase the participation ratio. 
One interesting result from our simulation under multi-region setting is that 
the insurance premium for An Giang province is higher than for Binh Thuan 
province in all cases, which differs from the current design of the pilot program. 
Intuitively, rice production is Binh Thuan province is considered to be exposed to 
higher risk than in An Giang province and therefore the insurance premium for 
Binh Thuan must be higher than the premium for An Giang. However, while the 
correlation between regional yields and the payoff of area yield insurance in 
Binh Thuan varies between 0.23 and -0.6, implying the higher basis risk; this 
parameter for An Giang is only from 0.12 to -0.89, implying the lower basis risk. 
In other words, rice production risk in Binh Thuan is highly idiosyncratic while 
the risk in An Giang is systematic and may cause effects on large scale. As a 
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result, although Binh Thuan is a high risk zone, the expected payoff from area 
yield crop insurance for Binh Thuan is lower than for An Giang and the premium 
is also lower. These results suggest that the premium for each province should 
not be only based on the general level of risk exposure of this region but the 
relative level of basis risk and the correlation between the losses across regions 
should also be taken into account. 
Table 12: Simulation Results 
 
6 Discussion and Conclusion  
In this paper we examine the demand and the factors that influence the demand 
of farmers for the area yield crop insurance program, using a contingent 
valuation survey and a framed field experiment. We find that information and 
trust are the two main factors influencing the demand of farmers for this 
insurance product. When farmers receive sufficient information about the 
insurance, the average WTP of farmers is very close to the premium in case of 
60% subsidy, suggesting that the demand for area yield crop insurance in Binh 
Thuan province should be higher than the current take up rate. Our results also 
confirm the important role of basis risk in determining the demand for area yield 
crop insurance. Farmers are highly averse to basis risk, especially when they 
already experienced the basis risk in the past. They are willing to switch to 
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individual yield insurance with higher premium when both types of insurance are 
offered to avoid the basis risk. 
The problem of basis risk can be partly solve through the multi-regional 
setting of the area yield crop insurance program. Results from our equilibrium 
pricing model suggest that if losses among regions are negatively correlated, 
regional diversification allows insurance company to reduce the premium rate. 
To take this advantage of the multi-regional setting, the premium for each 
province should not only based on the general level of risk exposure of this 
region but the relative level of basis risk and the correlation of losses across 
regions. 
The results of our study has some implications for policy-makers. First, in the 
pilot program the premium for An Giang province is lower than Binh Thuan 
province, which is reasonable if we only consider the general level of risk 
exposure of these regions. However, because the level of basis risk of Binh 
Thuan is higher than An Giang, when we analyze the equilibrium under multi-
region setting, the premium for An Giang province should be higher than for 
Binh Thuan province. In other words, if we take into account the relative level of 
basis risk and the correlation between losses across regions, the relative 
premium will be different from the one calculated from the risk exposure level 
only. Insurance company should pay attention to this point when they assign the 
premium for each province. 
One should notice that one of the main assumption of our equilibrium model 
is that the market consists of one seller and many buyers. In other words, our 
model is only used to analyze the seller-buyer relationship under monopoly, 
which allows the insurance company to employ the price discrimination strategy. 
However, if we relax the assumption of monopoly, all results may change and 
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profits of insurance companies should be equal to zero. Since the agricultural 
insurance market in Vietnam is completely monopolistic, this model is the most 
suitable one to analyze market equilibrium and provides useful advice.  
Secondly, according to our survey, the main marketing channel for the pilot 
program is media (tivi or radio). However, information through media can only 
help farmers to be aware of the availability of the insurance, not to understand 
fully the insurance, especially when this insurance is a new, innovative financial 
product. Moreover, providing farmers information through media cannot help to 
build the mutual understanding and trust between insurance company and 
farmers. While trust, knowledge about the insurance and sophisticated thinking 
are the main factors influencing the willingness to pay of farmers for area yield 
crop insurane, insurance company should invest in other marketing channels to 
explain the insurance to farmers better and to build trust. 
Finally, farmers in Binh Thuan province of Vietnam express that they are 
highly averse towards the basis risk. They are willing to pay more to avoid the 
basis risk, even when the expected gain is lower than the cost. This result 
suggests that the attractiveness of the area yield crop insurance in particular and 
the index insurance in general may be overstated due to the ignorance of 
farmers' aversion against basis risk and there is still a possibility for the feasibility 
of other types of crop insurance. Insurance company should consider again the 
advantages of index insurance over traditional crop insurance and may have 
more feasible studies to compare these two insurance types. 
Due to the limit of time, budget and knowledge, there are many 
shortcomings of this study. The lack of historical data, the inaccurate  
measurement of some variables and the simple experiment design are three 
main weaknesses. These weaknesses together with the findings  of this study 
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imply some suggestions for further research. 
In this study, due to the lack of historical data at individual and commune 
level, we only use the aggregate yield data. Therefore, we can only examine the 
general tendency and only give policy recommendations based on this instead of 
the detailed recommendations about the equilibrium price and quantity. Further 
research can combine between the yield data and the geographic data to 
increase the effectiveness of the equlibirum analysis and have better 
understanding about the level of basis risk. 
In our CV survey, we do not capture the subjective probability of the basis 
risk of farmers and only use risk experience as a measure of basis risk. In the 
literature, there are some ways to elicit the subjective probability of people such 
as the proper scoring rule (Brier, 1950; Good, 1952) or the bisection method 
(Abdellaoui et al., 2011). Further research may focus on farmers' subjective 
probability of the basis risk,  factors that influence this probability and the way  
this subjective probability influences the demand for area yield crop insurance. 
Moreoever, the results from our CV survey suggest that building trust and 
providing information are very important to increase the demand of farmers. 
When the traditional marketing channels (tivi or radio) seem not to be effective, 
more complicated marketing channels such as workshop may be very costly. 
Further research may examine which information channel is the most efficient 
one to introduce the insurance to farmers and how insurance company can build 
trust through such channel. 
In our framed field experiment, we can only show that people are averse to 
basis risk. However, the underlying mechanism for this aversion attitude is not 
clear. Elabed and Carter (2013) suggested that people are averse to basis risk 
and thus have lower demand for the area yield crop insurance than prediction 
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by the expected utility theory due to the fact that basis risk makes the area yield 
crop insurance become a compound lotter. This argument follows the argument 
of Halevy (2007) in which attitudes towards compound objective lotteries and 
attitudes toward ambiguity are tightly associated. However, farmers' aversion 
towards basis risk can also be explained by other phenomina such as perceived 
control (Bracha and Weber, 2012) or framing effects. Further research may 
design the experiment to test which mechanism is the main reason for the 
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Appendix 1. ABBREVIATIONS 
AW season : Autumn Winter season 
AYI : Annually Yield Insurance 
CRRA : Constant relative risk aversion 
CV : Contingent Valuation 
CVM : Contingent Valuation Method 
GDP : Gross Domestic Product 
IYI : Individual Yield Insurance 
SA season : Summer Autumn season 
VHLSS : Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey 
WS season : Winter Spring season 
WTP : Willing To Pay 
48 
 
Appendix 2. The CV questionnaire 
 
 








Interviewer Information:   
Are there people at home? Yes _____ Proceed with the survey 
1st Visit No _____  
Are there people at home? Yes _____ Proceed with the survey 
2nd Visit No _____  
   
Good morning (afternoon, night). My name is____________ I am conducting a 
survey regarding agricultural risk and we are interested in know your opinion about this 
topic. We would like to interview the person in the household who makes decision 




Yes _____ Thank you very much. 
 
No _____ Reason: 
 
[01] _____ Is not at home* 
 
[02]_____ Cannot answer in this moment* 
 
[03] _____Do not want to respond 
 
[04]_____ Other ______________________ 
 
* Can I come back in other day/moment for apply it? 
 
Yes _____ Day: _____________ Time __________ 
 
No _____ Finish the survey 
 
If respondent does not show up in the second visit, the household is classified as non-
respondent. Enumerator picks a neighbor as a replacement. 
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Section 1: Background information 
1. Year of birth:………………………………..  
2. Marital status: 1 = Single; 2 = Married; 3 = Divorced; 4 = Widow  
1 What class of school did you complete or what degrees have you received? 1 = no 
school; 2 = Elementary school; 3 = Middle School; 4 = High School; 5 = Vocational 
School; 6 = College/University; 7 = Post graduate  
4. Gender: 1 = Male; 0 = Female  
1 What is your religion? = Ancestor Worship; 2 = Buddhist; 3 = Catholic; 4 = 
Protestant; 5 = No Religion; 6 = Others  
6. What is your race? 1 = Kinh; 0 = Others  
7. Area you member of Communist party? 1 = yes; 0 = no  
8. Number of household members: …………………………………………….  
9. Number of years that you involve in rice production: …………………………………  
10. How much is your family average monthly income?  
 
11. How large proportion of income comes from rice production? ____% 





13. The house in which you live in: 1 = Owned by you; 2 = Owned by your parents/in-
laws; 3 = Owned by others; 4 = Rented  
14. How much do you think you would have to pay to buy a house similar to yours?  
15. How many ha of land does your household own? ……………………….ha  
16. Agricultural activities  
Year/Crop 16.1.Land 16.2.Land 16.3.Land 16.4. Land 16.5. Yield 
 owned (ha) lend (ha) rent (ha) used for  rice 
    production  
    (%)   
2012 WS       
2012 SA       
2012 AW       
17. Do you have a fish farm? 1 =yes 0 = no    
If a pond - please indicate size:_____________(m2) 
If a cage in river - please indicate size:_____________ (m2) 
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18. Do you own any livestock? If yes, please indicate quantity for 
each type: pigs:__________  




Section 2. Risk management strategies – Social capital – Time preferences 
19. In general, in the last 10 years, have you experienced disadvantage natural 
conditions (weather and epidemic – insect risk) that significantly affect on 
your rice production?  
Not at          Most of 
all          the 
          time 
           
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
           
O O O O O O O O O O O 
           
20. Does your household save to cater for emergency in future? 1 = yes; 0 = no  
21. If yes, how much is your household’s total saving now? __________  
22. How easy would it be to borrow 10000000 VND? (Enumerator: read 
responses)  
1 = Very easy  
2 = Somewhat easy  
3 = Somewhat difficult  
4 = Very difficult  
5 = Impossible  
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6 = Don’t know/not sure  
23. If you want to borrow 10000000 VND and cannot borrow it from a family 
member, where would you want to go to borrow it?  
1 = Neighbor/Friend  
2 = ROSCA  
3 = Official State-run Bank  
4 = Market money lender  
5 = Pawn shop (the place to take the motorbike or TV to get the money)  
6 = Other (please specify) ______________________  
7 = Don’t know/not sure  
24. What adaptation practices have your household made to cope with long 
term shifts in flooding during the last 5 years?  
Adaptation practices 24.1 Done the 24.2 When have you 
  practices (1=yes, done this practice (year) 
  0=no) and what did you do 
    
1. Changed crop variety   
    
2. Built a water harvesting system   
    
3. Built higher dykes   
    
4. Bought insurance   
    
5. Irrigated more   
    
6. Changed from crop to livestock   
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7. Migrated to another area   
    
8. Found off-farm jobs   
    
9. Leased your land   
    
25. Please indicate below how much you trust several institutions, with zero 
indicating that you do not trust them at all, and 10 indicating that you fully 
trust them:  
25.1.The local authorities: 
Do not trust at all       Fully trust 
           
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
           
O O O O O O O O O O O 
           
25.2.Banks and micro-insurance: 
 Do not trust at all         Fully trust 
            
0 1 2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
            
O O O  O O O O O O O O 
            
 






Do not trust at all        Fully trust 
            
0 1 2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
            
O O O  O O O O O O O O 
            
25.4.My neighbors:         
Do not trust at all        Fully trust 
            
0 1 2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
            
O O O  O O O O O O O O 
            
26. Imagine when you harvest, a middleman approaches and offers a term of 
payment that you agree on. You could obtain either a delayed payment six 
months from now, or a different smaller amount immediately. There is no risk 
involved—both amounts will be paid out for sure. Please indicate below 
instead of receiving a delayed payment of 800000 VND six months from now, 
which is the smallest amount that you would need to be paid right now. I 
would need to be given _____________Dong right now to give up the payment 
of 800000 VND six months from now.  
27. Imagine when you harvest, a middleman approaches and offers a term of 
payment that you agree on. You could obtain either a delayed payment one 
year from now, or a different smaller amount six months from now. There is no 
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risk involved—both amounts will be paid out for sure. Please indicate below 
instead of receiving a delayed payment of 800000 VND one year from now, 
which is the smallest delayed payment that you would need to be paid six 
months from now. I would need to be given _____________Dong 6 months 
from now to give up the payment of 800000 VND one year from now. 
Section 3. Pilot Insurance Program 
28. Do you know or have you heard of any agricultural insurance that you could 
purchase to protect your rice production against risks associated with 
disadvantage natural conditions? Please specify below:  
1 = I have been approached by someone outside your family  
2 = I have heard about the possibility, but have never been approached 
personally 3 = I have never heard about such insurance  
29. [Enumerator: ask this question if answer to question above =1] Where did you 
hear from?  1 = village leader/ local authority; 2 = insurance agent; 3= 
friend/neighbor/relatives; 4 = media (tivi/radio); 5 = others  
30. If you have heard about such insurance or have been approached, please answer 
the following:  
30.1.I am insured: 1= yes 0= no 
30.2.Please provide details about the insurance you are insured or you decided not 
to be insured: 
The premium: …………………………………….… $ per hectare (in local currency) The 
coverage (please describe…………………………………………………………. Payment 
condition (please describe): …………………………………………………. 
31. If you don’t know the premium, how much do you expect for the 
premium__________  
32. If you have heard about it but are not insured, please indicate the most important 
reasons for this below:  
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1 = the insurance was too expensive  
2 = I did not have the money at the time/ insufficient funds  
3 = who knows if they are really going to pay in case of damage  
4 = the administrative procedures are too complicated  
5 = I have neighbors/friends/family helping me out, so I do not need insurance  
6 = the insurance offered me was too complicated, I did not understand it  
7 = I felt I did not have enough information about the insurance 
8 = the government would help in case of disaster, so no need for insurance  
9 = I have not thought about it 
10 = I have not had time to think about it 
11= Do not need insurance for other reasons:_________ 
Section 4. WTP question 
Now we want to ask you more about the area yield crop insurance for rice production. 
This rice insurance product is provided by Bao Minh company, a state-owned insurance 
company. This product is designed to protect farmers against the loss due to natural 
calamity or epidemic diseases. 
The design of this area yield crop insurance is as follows: 
- This insurance is sold at the beginning of each crop season. If you buy this 
product, you may receive an indemnity when there is a loss in rice production 
caused by the following risk:  
o Natural calamity: storm, flood, drought, damaging cold, frost, tsunami, 
saltwater intrusion, typhoon, whirlwind. Natural calamity must be 
announced by the appropriate authorities.  
o Epidemic diseases: rice grassy stunt virus, rice ragged stunt virus, pyricularia 
oryzae carava, oryzae dowson, brown planthopper, stermborer. Epidemic 
diseases must be announced by the appropriate authorities.  
- The condition for indemnity payment is based on the average yield of the whole 
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commune, not based on individual yield. Details of the payment condition are as 
follows:  
- At the end of the crop season, if the average yield per hectare of your commune 
is lower than a pre-defined threshold and if you already bought the area yield 
crop insurance for your rice field at the beginning of the crop season, you will 
receive an indemnity payment, regardless of your real individual yield. This means 
that besides the case that you will receive an indemnity when your individual 
yield is low (you suffer a loss), there is another case in which you will not receive 
an indemnity although you suffer a loss, that is when your individual yield is low 
but the average yield of your commune is higher than the threshold. There is also 
a case that although your individual yield is high but the average yield of your 
commune is lower than the threshold, you still receive an indemnity payment. 
- The indemnity payment is calculated by the following formula:  
Indemnity payment = (average yield of your commune – threshold) x price x the area of 
your rice field 
- The average yield of your commune is the yield announced by the statistics 
branch at your commune at the end of the crop season.  
- The price is announced by the People’s Committee of your province at the 
beginning of the crop season. This price is used to calculate the premium of the 
insurance as well as the possible indemnity.  
- The threshold is the yield defined at the beginning of the crop season and it is 
written in the insurance contract. This pre-defined threshold is equal to 90% of 
the moving average of the past 3 years’ area yield of the corresponding growing 
seasons of your communes. These yields are from the statistics office’s annual 
year book.  
To buy this insurance, at the beginning of each crop season, you have to sign the 
contract with the insurance company and pay the premium. 
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The following table summarizes all characteristics of the area yield crop insurance for 
rice production: 
SUMMARY OF THE AREA YIELD CROP INSURANCE FOR RICE PRODUCTION 
The contract is signed and the premium is paid at the beginning of the crop season. 
You have to buy the insurance for all of your rice field (100% coverage). 
The threshold: 90% of the moving average of the past 3 years’ area yield of the 
corresponding growing seasons. 
 
Indemnity Payment Condition: 
If you buy the area yield crop insurance for rice production and if the average yield of 
the commune is lower than the threshold, you will received the indemnity payment at 
the end of the crop season. 
If you buy the area yield crop insurance for rice production and if the average yield of 
the commune is higher than the threshold, you will not receive the indemnity payment 
at the end of the crop season. 
The indemnity = (the threshold – the average yield of the commune) x Price x Area of 
rice field 
The indemnity payment is based only on the average yield of your commune, not based 
on your individual yield. You may receive the indemnity when you suffer a loss or not 
and you may not receive the indemnity when you suffer a loss. 
 
Before we continue, please answer all of the questions in the “Comprehensive Test”. 
These questions are used to make sure that you fully understand the area yield crop 
insurance. We will explain all of these questions again after you finish answering these 
questions. 
Comprehensive Test 
1. Will you receive the indemnity if your individual yield is lower than the 
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threshold?  1. Yes;  2. No;  3. Not Sure  
2. Is there any possibility that you receive the indemnity if you don’t suffer a 
loss? 1. Yes; 2. No 
3. Is there any possibility that you don’t received the indemnity if you suffer a 
loss? 1. Yes; 2. No 
4. If your individual yield is 500 kg/cong; the average yield of your commune is 
600, the threshold is 560 kg/cong, the price is 6000 VND/kg, will you receive 
an indemnity? 1. Yes; 2. No; If yes, the indemnity is………………………………..  
5. If your individual yield is 700 kg/cong; the average yield of your commune is 
600, the threshold is 560 kg/cong, the price is 6000 VND/kg, will you receive 
an indemnity? 1. Yes; 2. No; If yes, the indemnity is………………………………..  
6. If your individual yield is 300 kg/cong; the average yield of your commune is 
600, the threshold is 560 kg/cong, the price is 6000 VND/kg, will you receive 
an indemnity? 1. Yes; 2. No  
7. If your individual yield is 700 kg/cong; the average yield of your commune is 
400, the threshold is 560 kg/cong, the price is 6000 VND/kg, will you receive 
an indemnity? 1. Yes; 2. No; If yes, the indemnity is………………………………..  
8. If your individual yield is 300 kg/cong; the average yield of your commune is 
400, the threshold is 560 kg/cong, the price is 6000 VND/kg, will you receive 
an indemnity? 1. Yes; 2. No; If yes, the indemnity is……………………………….. 
9. If your individual yield is 500 kg/cong; the average yield of your commune is 
560, the threshold is 560 kg/cong, the price is 6000 VND/kg, will you receive 
an indemnity? 1. Yes; 2. No; If yes, the indemnity is………………………………..  
10. If the probability of the event that your average yield is lower than the 
threshold is 10%; the probability of the event that your individual yield is 
lower than the threshold is 5%; what is the probability of the event that you 




We now want to ask you about the premium that you are willing to pay to buy this area 
yield insurance for your rice field for one crop season in 2014. Assume that the threshold 
used in this contract is 560 kg/cong (56 Q/ha) (=90% of the moving average of the area 
yield of 3 years 2013, 2012, 2011) and the price is 6000 VND/kg. At the end of the crop 
season, if the average yield of your commune is lower than 560 kg/cong and if you buy 
the insurance, you will receive an indemnity based on the threshold (560 kg/cong); the 
average yield of your commune of this crop season and the price (6000 VND/kg). These 
are some examples: 
 
33. If the premium is B1 for each insured cong, are you willing to pay for insurance?  
1 = Yes (go to question 34)  
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0 = No (go to question 35)  
34. If the premium is Bh for each insured cong, are you willing to pay for insurance?  
1 = Yes 0 = No 
35. If the premium is Bl for each insured cong, are you willing to pay for insurance? 
1 = Yes 0 = No   
Questionnaire code  Bl B1 Bh 
  (VND/cong) (VND/cong) (VND/cong) 
     
1  10000 20000 30000 
2 20000 30000 40000 
3 30000 40000 50000 
4 40000 50000 60000 
5 50000 60000 70000 
 
Section 5. Binswanger experiment (hypothetical question) 
Now image that you have a chance to participate in a game. In this game, you can 
make a bet on coin flip. First, you can choose the side of the coin (head or tail) that you 
want to bet on. Then you will toss the air to determine whether you win or not. For 
example, if you choose to bet on the head and the face-up side after the toss is the 
head, you will win the game but if you choose to bet on the head and the face-up side 
after the toss is the tail, you will lose. If you win, you will receive an amount A and if 
you lose, you will receive an amount B. 
36. These are 6 coin flipping games with different outcomes for winning/losing. If you 





Lottery Amount A (winning) Amount B (losing) 
   
1 50 50 
   
2 95 45 
   
3 120 40 
   
4 150 30 
   
5 190 10 
   
6 200 0 





Appendix 3. The Insurance Game - Instruction 
Thank you for coming! You've earned 30.000 VND for joining this experiment, and the 
instructions explain how you make decisions to earn more money. So please read these 
instructions carefully! There is no talking at any time during this experiment. If you have 
a question, please raise your hand, and an experimenter will assist you. 
The experiment is divided into two different stages. There will be 2 rounds in the first 
stage. The second stage will consist of 10 rounds. In all, the experiment will have 12 
rounds. You will be randomly assigned to a group with 9 other participants. The 
composition of each group will NOT change during the entire experiment. All players in 
one group belong to one area. 
Each round represents a crop season, in which you will invest all land in rice production. 
Each of you will have a hectare of land for rice production in each round and you will 
receive the yield based on the general condition of the whole area and your individual 
luck. The points you receive in each round is equal to the yield you get and all the points 
you get from 12 rounds of the second stage will be exchanged to money and pay to you 
at the end of the game. The yield may be high (means you have a good crop) or low 
(means you have a poor crop), depending on how the general condition and your 
individual luck are. More details about this will be given later. 
At the end of the first stage (2 rounds), everyone in the group will have an opportunity 
to buy insurance to protect you from the loss in the second stage (10 rounds). You can 
choose among 3 different insurance contracts or choose not to do anything. One of the 
10 rounds will be randomly chosen at the end of the experiment and the points you earn 
from this round will be exchanged to money through an exchange rate and this amount 
will be paid to you inaddition of the show up fee (30000 VND). The exchange rate is 1 
point = 150 VND. 
Part 1. The crop season (2 trial rounds) 
Calculating your own yield 
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Each round in this game represents a crop season in which you will invest your resource 
in rice production. Each of you will have one hectare of land for growing rice. Your 
individual yield depends on the natural condition, which influence the yield of the 
whole area and your own individual luck. Because the natural condition is the same for 
all farmers in your area, all players in your group will suffer from the same “Area 
condition”, which is divided into 5 conditions: “Very bad”, “Bad”, “Normal”, “Good”, 
“Very good” and has corresponding area yield for. However, your individual yield is not 
only influenced by the “area condition” but also by your own individual luck. In one crop 
season (one round in this game) when the “area condition” is “very bad”, if your 
individual luck is good, your yield may be higher than the average yield of the whole area 
and thus, not too low while if the “area condition” is “very good” but your individual luck 
is bad, your own yield may be lower than the average yield of the whole area and thus, 
not too high. 
The “Payoff Table” you have on the desk will show you how to determine your own 
yield (quintal/ha) based on the “area condition” and your “individual luck”. The third 
row shows the average yield of the whole area in each “area condition” while the 
values in the next 3 rows show your individual yield depending on the combination 
between area condition and individual luck. For example, if the area condition of this 
crop season (this round) is very bad, and your individual luck is normal, your individual 
yield of this crop season is 30 QQ and the average area yield is also 30 QQ. If the area 
condition of this crop season (this round) is very high but your individual luck is low, 
your individual yield is 50 QQ while the average area yield is 60 QQ. 
Yield (Quintal)   Area condition    
          
  1. Very bad 2. Bad  3. Normal  4. High 5. Very  
        high  
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  200 350  450  550 700  
          
Individual 1. Low 80 250  350  450 580  
Luck 
         






    
          
 3. High 320 450  550  650 820  
          
 
Determining the area condition and the individual luck      
To determine the area condition, at the end of each round, one player from your group 
will draw a chip from the white bag. This bag contains 10 chips, including 1 black, 2 red, 
4 white, 2 blue and 1 green chips. The black chip represents the “Very bad” condition, 
the red chip represents the “Bad” condition, the while chip represents the “Normal” 
condition, the blue chip represents the “Good” condition and the green chip represents 
the “Very good” condition. We will write down the condition as well as the average 
area yield of each crop season on the board in sequence so that all of you can see the 
results. 
Then, each player will draw a ball from the yellow bag to determine your own individual 
luck. This bag contains 4 balls, including 1 red, 2 white and 1 yellow balls. The red ball 
represents the “Low” luck, the white ball represents the “Normal” luck, and the yellow 
ball represents the “High” luck. Please write down the “area condition”, your own 
“individual luck”, calculate your own yield based on the “area condition” and your 
“individual luck” and write down the result on the “RESULT SHEET”. 
In the 5 trial rounds of the first stage, you will not make any decision. Your yield will be 
determined by the results of these two drawings. After all of you calculate your 
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individual yields of the crop season, our enumerator will check all of the results and 
will explain again the rules if there is some wrong. 
Do you have any questions? 
Comprehensive Test 
Before we start the first 2 trial rounds, please answer all of the questions in the 
“Comprehensive Test Sheet”. If you find any difficulty in answering these questions, 
please raise your hand and we will come and help you. 
Comprehensive Test 
1. If the area condition is “Normal” and your individual luck is “Normal”, your yield 
of this crop season is ……………………………….  
2. If the area condition is “Good” and your individual luck is “Low”, your yield of this 
crop season is ……………………………….  
3. If the area condition is “Very Bad” and your individual luck is “High”, your yield of 
this crop season is ……………………………….  
4. How many out of 10 rounds do you think will have a “Good” area condition? In 
other words, the probability that your team can draw a “Good” area condition at 
one round is ………………………………….  
5. How many out of 10 rounds do you think will have a “Normal” area condition? In 
other words, the probability that your team can draw a “Good” area condition at 
one round is…………………………………. 
6. How many out of 10 rounds do you think you will have a “High” individual luck? 
In other words, the probability that you can draw a “High” area condition at one 
round is ………………………………….  
7. How many out of 10 rounds do you think you will have a “Normal area condition” 
and a “Normal” individual luck? In other words, the probability that you can draw 




(Start the 2 trial rounds) 
Part 2. The crop season with area yield crop insurance (5 rounds) 
Since this round, you have a chance to buy an insurance to protect your crop season. 
You can choose between 2 options described as follows: 
1.  Option 1: Buy an area yield crop insurance with the coverage level of 90%. 
This area yield crop insurance contract has the following features: 
- Premium: 37.8 Q/ha. Because each of you only own 1 hectare of land, if you 
decide to buy this insurance, you have to pay 37.8 points from your total winning 
points of this crop season.  
- Payment conditions: The indemnity of this insurance is paid based on the average 
yield of the whole area. If the average area yield of one crop season is lower 
than a threshold level and if you buy this insurance in this crop season, you will 
be paid an amount equal to the difference between the threshold level and the 
area yield, regardless of your individual level. It means that apart from the case 
that you receive the payment when your individual yield is low, there is a case in 
which your individual yield is low but the average area yield is higher than the 
threshold level so that you don’t receive any payment and there is also a case in 
which your individual yield is high but the average area yield is lower than the 
threshold level so that you receive the payment. We want to remind you that 
the average area yield in one crop season (one round) is determined by the 
“area condition” and showed in the third row of the “PAYOFF TABLE” while 
your individual yield is determined by the combination of the “area 
condition”and “individual luck”. 
- The threshold level of the area yield insurance in this game is 90% of the area 
yield in a normal year: 450 x 90% = 405 Q.  
- All features of this insurance as well as the calculation of the final yield is 
described by the “AREA YIELD CROP INSURANCE TABLE”  
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AREA YIELD CROP INSURANCE TABLE 
- Premium: 37.8  
- Threshold level: 90% of average area yield in a normal area condition = 90% x 
450 = 405  
- Payment mechanism and final individual yield:  
• If you decide to buy this insurance and the average yield of the whole area 
in this crop season is lower than 405, you will receive the payment and 
your final individual yield is:  
Final individual yield = Individual yield – 37.8 + (405 – Average yield of 
the 
whole area) 
• If you decide to buy this insurance and the average yield of the whole area 
in this crop season is equal to or higher than 405, you will not receive the 
payment and your final individual yield is:  
Final individual yield = Individual yield – 37.8 
- Do you have any question?  
- If you don’t have any question, please answer these following examples.  
 Example 1 Example 2 Example 3 Example 4 
     
Area condition Bad Bad Normal High 
     
Individual luck Normal High Low Normal 
     
 Average yield of the      
 whole are      
 Individual yield     
     
70 
 
 You receive payment    
or not     
 Insurance payment 
     
 Final individual yield 
     
2.  Option 2: Do not buy any insurance 
In this option, you don’t buy any insurance and your individual yield is calculated as in 
the first 3 trial rounds. 
Do you have any question? 
How to make decision in these rounds 
In each round of this stage, you will have time to consider 3 options and make decisions. 
Your decisions are separate among rounds, which mean that your decision in one round 
do not affect your decision in the next round. After you make decision, please stick on 
the option you want to choose on the “DECISION SHEET” and submit it to us. Please also 
write down on the “RESULT SHEET” the option you want to choose. 
After all of you submit your decisions, we will invite one member of your group to draw 
one chip from the white bag to determine the “area condition” and each of you will then 
draw a ball from the yellow bag to determine your “Individual Luck”. Please write down 
the “area condition”, your own “individual luck”, calculate your own yield based on 
the “area condition” and your “individual luck”, calculate the indemnity of the 
insurance if you buy one and then calculate your final yields. Please write down all the 
results on the “RESULT SHEET”. 
Do you have any question? 
Part 2 (cont). The crop season with area yield crop insurance and indemnity insurance 
(5 rounds) 
Since this round, besides the two options, you can choose another option, that is buying 
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an individual indemnity insurance. It means that now you can choose among 3 options 
to manage your risk. Let us explain the indemnity insurance as following: 
Option 3: Buy an individual indemnity insurance 
This individual indemnity insurance contract has the following features: 
- Premium: 71 Q/ha. Because each of you only own 1 hectare of land, if you decide 
to buy this insurance, you have to pay 71 points from your total winning points of 
this crop season.  
- Payment conditions: The indemnity of this insurance is paid based on your 
individual yield. If your individual yield is lower than a threshold level and if you 
buy this insurance in this crop season, you will be paid an amount equal to the 
difference between the threshold level and your individual yield.  
- The threshold level of this individual indemnity insurance is 90% of the area yield 
in a normal year: 450 x 90% = 405 Q.  
- All features of this insurance as well as the calculation of the final yield is 
described by the “INDIVIDUAL INDEMNITY INSURANCE”  
INDIVIDUAL INDEMNITY INSURANCE TABLE 
- Premium: 71  
- Threshold level: 90% of average area yield in a normal area condition = 90% x 450 
= 405  
- Payment mechanism and final individual yield:  
• If you decide to buy this insurance and your individual yield in this crop 
season is lower than 405, you will receive the payment and your final 
individual yield is:  
Final individual yield = Individual yield – 71 + (405 – Individual yield) 
= 405 – 71 
• If you decide to buy this insurance and your individual yield in this crop 
season is higher than or equal to 405, you will not receive the payment 
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and your final individual yield is:  
Final individual yield = Individual yield – 71 
- Do you have any question?  
- If you don’t have any question, please answer these following examples.  
  Example 1 Example 2 Example 3 Example 4 
      
Area condition  Bad Bad Normal High 
      
Individual luck  Normal High Low Normal 
      
Average  yield  of the     
whole are      
Individual yield      
     
You  receive  payment     
or not      
Insurance payment      
     
Final individual yield     
     
How to make decision in these rounds    
In each round of this stage, you will have time to consider 3 options and make decisions. 
Your decisions are separate among rounds, which mean that your decision in one round 
do not affect your decision in the next round. After you make decision, please stick on 
the option you want to choose on the “DECISION SHEET” and submit it to us. Please also 
write down on the “RESULT SHEET” the option you want to choose. 
After all of you submit your decisions, we will invite one member of your group to draw 
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one chip from the white bag to determine the “area condition” and each of you will then 
draw a ball from the yellow bag to determine your “Individual Luck”. Please write down 
the “area condition”, your own “individual luck”, calculate your own yield based on 
the “area condition” and your “individual luck”, calculate the indemnity of the 
insurance if you buy one and then calculate your final yields. Please write down all the 
results on the “RESULT SHEET”. 
Do you have any question? 
